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Admiralty
by Robert S. Glenn, Jr.*
Colihn A. McRae**
and Jessica L. McClellan***
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals presented practitioners of
maritime law with important new admiralty case law in 2004. Although
the Eleventh Circuit published only four admiralty opinions in 2004, the
United States Supreme Court handed down two decisions in the areas
of cargo and longshore law that will have a far-reaching impact on
maritime law. The Eleventh Circuit dealt with two passenger cruise line
cases and a salvage dispute, both of which serve as the subject of
considerable litigation in the Eleventh Circuit. In addition, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals handed down an important decision involving
the enforcement of arbitration clauses, which has become an increasingly
popular procedure for resolving maritime disputes.
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty. Ltd.

On November 9, 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty. Ltd.,1 a landmark
opinion that will have far-reaching effects on maritime cargo law. In
Kirby the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that Himalaya
Clauses2 in both a Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier's ("NVOCC")
bill of lading and a Vessel Operating Common Carrier's ("VOCC") bill of
lading extended the bill of lading's package limitation' to the participating inland carrier, the Norfolk Southern Railway Co.4 The Supreme
Court's opinion also upheld the enforcement of the package limitation
contained in the VOCC's bill of lading, even though no strict privity of
contract between Kirby, the cargo interest, and the VOCC existed.5
Kirby involved a shipment of cargo from Australia to Athens, Alabama
by way of Huntsville, Alabama. Kirby received a bill of lading from a
NVOCC, International Cargo Control, for the carriage from Australia to
Huntsville. The NVOCC in turn contracted with Hamburg Stid, the
VOCC, to perform the ocean carriage. The VOCC issued its bill of lading
for the same carriage from Australia to Huntsville.6
The cargo was discharged in good condition in Savannah, Georgia and
was delivered to the Norfolk Southern Railway to carry the cargo from
Savannah to Huntsville, Alabama. The cargo was damaged during the
rail carriage.7
Kirby sued Norfolk Southern Railway in tort and argued that the
railroad could not limit its liability because no contractual relationship
existed between the cargo interest and the VOCC carrier, which was
necessary to give the railroad the package limitation protection available
under the VOCC bill of lading. The railroad maintained that its liability

1. 125 S. Ct. 385 (2004).
2. A Himalaya Clause is an exculpatory provision that extends the protections that are
available to the ocean carrier under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA") to other
entities (46 App. U.S.C. §§ 1300-15). 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME
LAW § 10-8, at 40-41 (Practitioners Treatise Series, 2d ed. 1994).
3. The "package limitation" is a provision under COGSA that will, under certain
circumstances, limit an ocean carrier's liability for cargo damage to $500 per package or
"customary freight unit." 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (2000).
4. Kirby, 125 S. Ct. at 400.
5. Id. at 397.

6. Id. at 390.
7. Id. at 391.
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was limited under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA") through
the Himalaya Clause.8
The district court agreed with the railroad, but the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding there was no privity of contract between the shipper
and the railroad as required by state law.9 The Eleventh Circuit
granted Kirby complete recovery against the railroad without applying
the COGSA and bill of lading package limitations.1" The United States
Supreme Court reversed on appeal."
The Supreme Court, citing North Pacific S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine
Railway & Shipbuilding Co.,12 first examined whether the contract of
inland carriage was an admiralty contract, which "'depends upon. .. the
nature and character of the contract,' and whether it had 'reference to
maritime service of maritime transactions."'13 The Court determined
the contract was maritime in nature, and the need for a uniform
maritime approach was not affected by the fact that the damage was
incurred during the inland portion of the transit." The Court explained that state interests in this matter could be accommodated
without defeating the more important federal interest in efficient
maritime commerce. 5 The Supreme Court thus held that Himalaya
Clauses in both the NVOCC and the VOCC bill of lading were sufficient
to extend the respective carrier defenses to the railroad.'"
In perhaps the most significant aspect of the opinion, the Court in
Kirby held that privity of contract is not necessary between cargo
interests and the VOCC for the VOCC to enjoy the package limitation
contained in its own bill of lading. 7 The Court reasoned that the
NVOCC, although not an agent of the cargo interests, acted as a limited
agent of cargo for the purpose of accepting the liability limit in the
contract with the VOCC.' 8
The Court held strict privity of contract was not necessary for three
reasons. First, binding the cargo interests to the limits its NVOCC
9
The Court
negotiated with the VOCC tracks industry practices.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 392.
Id.
Id.
Id.
249 U.S. 119 (1919).
Kirby, 125 S. Ct. at 393 (quoting Hall Bros., 249 U.S. at 125).
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 399.
Id.
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explained that in intercontinental ocean shipping, carriers may not know
whether they are dealing with an intermediary or the cargo owner.2"
Moreover, even if the carriers know that they are dealing with an
intermediary, the Court explained they might not know how many other
intermediaries came before or what obligations may be outstanding
among them.2 According to the Supreme Court, the "task of information gathering might be very costly or even impossible, given that goods
often change hands many times in the course of intermodal transportation."22
Second, the Supreme Court concluded that if the VOCC could not
depend on its bill of lading limits, it would likely charge higher freight
rates to the NVOCCs to protect itself in the event the VOCC was not
protected in suits brought by cargo interests.2" Finally, the Court
explained that granting the VOCC the package limitation-and
extending the coverage of the VOCC's Himalaya Clause as well as the
NVOCC's Himalaya Clause to the railroad-produced an equitable
result.24 That is, the cargo interests retained the option of suing the
NVOCC for any loss suffered by cargo because the NVOCC had allowed
the VOCC to lower its liability limits below the limit agreed upon
between the cargo and the NVOCC.
In its conclusion, the Supreme Court declared that its task was not to
structure the international shipping industry but to ensure that "[f]uture
parties remain free to adapt their contracts to the rules set forth here,
only now with the benefit of greater predictability concerning the rules
for which their contracts might compensate." 25 Indeed, the decision in
Kirby should help unify United States law governing the multimodal
carriage of goods.
B.

Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorariin the personal
injury case of Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.,26 to clarify what the
27
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA)
considers a "vessel.",2 In Stewart defendant employed plaintiff aboard

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 399-400.
Id. at 400.
125 S. Ct. 1118 (2005).
33 U.S.C. § 901 (2000).
Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1121.
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its vessels as a marine engineer. Although he spent the majority of his
time aboard the SUPER SCOOP, a dredge with a clamshell bucket,
Stewart was occasionally required to perform maintenance tasks aboard
the SCOW 4, which transported dredged material and dumped it at sea.
In July 1993 the SCOW 4's engine was replaced. 29 During the process
of loading the new engine, Stewart was "precariously perched above the
hatch" when the SUPER SCOOP's crew moved the SCOW 4, causing a
jolt that threw Stewart headfirst to a deck below, resulting in serious
injuries.' ° Stewart filed suit against his employer for damages under
the Jones Act, 1 alleging that he was a seaman injured by Dutra's
negligence and also under § 905(b) of the LHWCA, 2 which authorizes
covered employees to sue a vessel owner as a third party for an injury
caused by the owner's negligence."
At trial Stewart argued his employer was negligent in (1) causing the
SCOW 4 to crash suddenly into the SUPER SCOOP; (2) failing to sound
a warning blast prior to moving the SCOW 4; and (3) creating an unsafe
work environment by removing the protective railing around the
hatch. 34 Dutra responded with motions for summary judgment on
these counts. With respect to the Jones Act count, the district court
concluded that because the SUPER SCOOP was not a "vessel," as
defined by the Jones Act, defendant was entitled to summary judgment.
Stewart appealed to the First Circuit, which affirmed, concluding the
SUPER SCOOP was not "a vessel in navigation" as that term has
developed in the jurisprudence of the Jones Act. 35 Following the
decision in Stewart I, Dutra renewed its motion for summary judgment
on Stewart's LHWCA claim. The district court granted the motion, and
Stewart again appealed to the First Circuit.36
The key issue before the First Circuit was whether defendant's
negligence was committed in its capacity as employer (for which it is
immune from tort liability under § 905(a) of the LHWCA) or vessel
owner (for which it may be held liable pursuant to § 905(b) of the

29. Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 343 F.3d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 2003).
30. Id. at 13.
31. 46 App. U.S.C. § 688(a) (2000).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2000). This section provides, in pertinent part: "In the event
of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then
such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring
an action against such vessel as a third party...." Id.
33. Stewart, 343 F.3d at 13.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 230 F.3d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 2001) (Stewart

D).
36.

Id.
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LHWCA).3 v The First Circuit applied the functional dual capacity test
and rejected tort liability on the part of defendant employer and vessel
owner. Citing Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit,5 the First Circuit noted
that maritime employees "'were expected as part of their employment
duties to lend a hand with supporting maritime chores as well as to
pursue their particular construction trade.'" 39 In afflrming summary
judgment, the First Circuit noted that Dutra had conceded the SUPER
SCOOP was a vessel under § 905(b), but decided that Dutra's alleged
negligence had been committed in its capacity as an employer and not
as the vessel's owner.4 °
On February 23, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Stewart to clarify the legal standard for determining whether a special
purpose watercraft, such as a dredge, is a "vessel" for purposes of the
LHWCA. 4' Oral argument was held on November 1, 2004,42 and the
Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision on February 22, 2005,
reversing the First Circuit and holding that a dredge is a "vessel" under
the LHWCA.43
Because the term "vessel" is not defined in the LHWCA, the Supreme
Court based its holding in Stewart on sections 1 and 3 of the Revised
Statutes of 1873, 44 which define "vessel." 5 Section 3 defines "vessel"
to include "every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance
used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water."46 The Court explained that it is "often said that dredges and
watercraft qualify as vessels under the Jones Act and
comparable
47
LHWCA."
Reviewing the holding from the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
noted that the First Circuit relied on its previous decision in DiGiovanni
v. Traylor Bros.45 in concluding that the SUPER SCOOP was not a
vessel "because its primary purpose [was] not navigation or commerce,

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
of the
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 14.
97 F.3d 603 (1st Cir. 1996).
Stewart, 343 F.3d at 14 (quoting Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 97 F.3d 603).
Id. at 13.
Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 540 U.S. 1177 (2004)
Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 125 S. Ct. 1118 (2005).
Id. at 1129.
18 Stat., pt. 1, p. 1 (1873). Section 3 was repealed and recodified in 1947 as part
Rules of Construction Act, 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1120.
1 U.S.C. § 3.
Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1126.
959 F.2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1992).
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and because it was not in actual transit at the time of Stewart's
injury. " The Supreme Court held that "Inleither prong of the [First
Circuit's] test [was] consistent with the text of § 3 or the established
meaning of the term 'vessel' under the general maritime law."50 The
Court explained that § 3 only requires "that a watercraft be 'used, or
capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water' in order
to qualify as a vessel."5 ' Similarly, the Supreme Court, relying on its
holding in Chandris,Inc. v. Latsis,5 2 held that "a watercraft need not
be in motion to qualify as a vessel under § 3," and the "in navigation"
requirement was not meant to be interpreted apart from the rest of the
definition of § 35' Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that "[ulnder
§ 3, a 'vessel' is any watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or state of transit at a
particular moment."54 Because "the SUPER SCOOP was engaged in
maritime transportation at the time of Stewart's injury, it was a vessel
within the meaning of 1 U.S.C. § 3. "55
III.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT OPINIONS

PassengerCruise Lines
The Eleventh Circuit, in Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,56 ruled that
a cruise line is strictly liable for crewmember assaults on passengers
during the cruise.5 7 Plaintiff was a passenger on a cruise ship sailing
from New York City to Bermuda. During the cruise, plaintiff reported
to the cruise line's medical staff that she had been sexually assaulted by
a crewmember and sexually battered by a dinner waiter. Plaintiff filed
suit against four defendants alleging negligence, vicarious or strict
liability for the crewmember's sexual assault, vicarious or strict liability
for the waiter's sexual battery, and vicarious or strict liability for the
crewmember and waiter's intentional infliction of emotional distress
upon her.5"
A.

49. Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1127.
50. Id. at 1127-28.
51. Id. at 1128 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 3).
52. 515 U.S. 347 (1995).
53. Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1128.
54. Id. at 1129.
55. Id.
56. 394 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2004).

57. Id. at 918.
58.

Id. at 894.
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The case proceeded to trial in which the jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff on her sexual battery claim but returned a verdict for defendants on her sexual assault claim. Defendants filed several postjudgment motions, and at the hearing on the motions, the district court
raised sua sponte the issue of whether any one of the four defendants
was both a common carrier and the crewmember's employer.59 Finding
none of defendants met both requirements, the district court granted a
Rule 50(b) 60 judgment as a matter of law to all defendants. The court
concluded that no defendant could be liable for the crewmember's assault
and vacated its judgment in favor of plaintiff.6
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first examined whether it had
admiralty jurisdiction over the case. 2 The court explained that
"[a]lthough this case may represent the outer boundaries of admiralty
jurisdiction over torts," admiralty jurisdiction extends to the location of
the sexual battery under the particular circumstances of the case.63
After concluding it had admiralty jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the Rule 50(b) entry of judgment for defendants because the
district court lacked authority to enter judgment under Rule 50(b) on a
new ground not raised by any party before submission of the case to the
jury.64 Finally, the court explained that the cruise line was a common
carrier and that a common carrier is strictly liable for the safety of its
passengers without regard to who actually employed the individual crew
member that committed the assault.6 5 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the jury's verdict for plaintiff and remanded the case to
the district court to enter final judgment on the jury's verdict.6
In NOVA Information Systems, Inc. v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 67
the Eleventh Circuit was presented with the challenge of determining
which party in a cruise line bankruptcy context should bear the financial
losses associated with reimbursing would-be passengers who had used
their credit cards to pre-pay for cruise tickets.68 The case arose out of
the financial woes experienced by Premier Cruise Lines, which ceased
operations in September 2001. Upon learning of the cancellation of
Premier's cruise operations, numerous pre-paid passengers sought

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 896.
FED. R. Crw. P. 50(b).
Celebrity Cruises, 394 F.3d at 896-97.
Id. at 900-01.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 902-03.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 918.
365 F.3d 996 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1000.
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reimbursement for amounts they had paid using their credit cards for
tickets on future Premier cruises. The dispute arose when Premier's
credit card processing company, plaintiff NOVA Information Systems,
Inc. ("NOVA"), sought reimbursement from Premier's surety company,
defendant Greenwich Insurance Co. ("Greenwich"), for amounts NOVA
had to refund to the pre-paid passengers.6 9
The court in NOVA began its analysis by detailing the structure of
credit card purchases of cruise tickets, under which NOVA, as the credit
card processing company, would seek reimbursement from Premier if a
passenger was given a refund by its card-issuing bank."0 Realizing that
it faced a substantial financial risk of loss, NOVA requested that
Premier provide adequate assurances that this risk be covered under the
surety bond Premier obtained to secure the transactions." After
Premier's original surety, Amwest, refused to provide such assurance of
coverage for NOVA, Premier then contracted with defendant Greenwich
to provide a surety bond that "inure[d] to the benefit of any and all
passengers to whom the Principal [Premier] may be held legally liable
.... 72 Greenwich then prepared a proposed letter of assurance stating
that NOVA would be covered under the bond. In exchange for obtaining
such additional financial protection for NOVA, Premier requested that
NOVA reduce the fees it charged for its credit processing services.
NOVA continued to process Premier's credit card transactions but never
agreed to the reduction in fees. 3
After Premier ceased operations in September 2001, its credit card
pre-paid passengers began demanding-and receiving-refunds from
After the card-issuing banks received
their card-issuing banks.
reimbursements from NOVA for the passenger refund amounts, NOVA
sought recourse against the Greenwich surety bond. Greenwich denied
NOVA's claim for coverage under the Greenwich surety bond, and NOVA
accordingly filed suit against Greenwich in the Southern District of
Florida. NOVA's suit consisted of two legal theories-breach of contract
and contractual subrogation-and four equitable claims-estoppel,
equitable subrogation, contribution, and unjust enrichment-all of which

69. Id. at 1002.
70. Id. at 1000.
71. A surety bond was required by federal law and by the Federal Maritime
Commission to "provide evidence that [Premier] could refund any unearned passenger
deposits." Id. at 1000-01 (citing 46 App. U.S.C. § 817e(a) (repealed 1995); 46 C.F.R.
§§ 540.3, 540.22 (2004)).
72. Nova, 365 F.3d at 1001.

73.

Id.
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were denied by the district court's grant of summary judgment to
defendant. 4
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant Greenwich on NOVA's legal claims for
breach of contract and conventional subrogation.7 5 The breach of
contract claim failed because NOVA was neither a party to the
Premier/Greenwich surety bond contract nor a third-party beneficiary.76
The Greenwich bond had been issued to protect Premier's passengers,
not NOVA. The court of appeals rejected NOVA's somewhat counterintuitive argument that "credit card companies" should be included in
the definition of "passengers" under the Federal Maritime Commission's
regulations. 7
Next, NOVA argued that it should be entitled to subrogation rights
against Greenwich because it had received an assignment of claim
document from those passengers it had reimbursed.7" The court of
appeals quickly rejected this "misplaced" argument.7 9
NOVA had
received the assignments only after those passengers had been reimbursed. 80 After reimbursement the passengers no longer had a claim
to be assigned, and thus, no subrogation rights existed.81
NOVA was similarly unsuccessful on its equitable theories of
recovery-promissory or equitable estoppel, equitable subrogation,
contribution, and unjust enrichment-each of which was considered and
rejected in turn by the court of appeals.82 The court first considered
NOVAs estoppel argument-to wit, that it had reasonably relied, to its
detriment, on a representation from Greenwich that NOVA would be
covered under Premier's surety bond. 83 NOVA's estoppel argument
relied on the notion that Greenwich had made an affirmative representation regarding coverage for NOVA, when the negotiations on that point
were never concluded due to NOVA's refusal to lower its fees.84 The
court of appeals concluded that any reliance on such proposed language

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id. at 1003-04.
Id. See 46 C.F.R. § 540.2(a), (g) (2004).
Nova, 365 F.3d at 1004.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1004-06.
Id. at 1004-05.
Id. at 1005.
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would
be unreasonable, and therefore, NOVA's estoppel claims must
5
fail.
NOVA's next novel argument provided for reimbursement from
Greenwich under the theory of "equitable subrogation." One element of
an "equitable subrogation" cause of action is that the party seeking
subrogation must show that it has paid for the debt of another.8
NOVA was contractually obligated to reimburse the passengers' refund
amounts regardless of whether the passengers ever made a claim against
Greenwich's surety bond.8 7 NOVA's claim for subrogation failed
because NOVA paid its own debt when it reimbursed the passengers, not
the debt of another.8
The court of appeals also rejected NOVA's claim for equitable
contribution, a doctrine whose goal is to "'distribute equally among those
who have a common obligation, the burden of performing that obligation."'8 9 The court of appeals noted that, technically, NOVA acted as
the credit card processor for Premier's bank, First Union, and therefore,
was responsible for making reimbursement payments directly to First
Union.9" Greenwich, on the other hand, was obligated under the surety
bond to make reimbursement payments directly to the passengers
themselves.91 The obligations of NOVA and Greenwich were, therefore,
not "common," and NOVA could not maintain a claim for equitable
contribution from Greenwich.92
B.

Arbitration
In Bautista v. Star Cruises,9" the Eleventh Circuit considered the
effect of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 94 on a mandatory arbitration clause found in a foreign seaman's employment contract. 95
Plaintiffs in Bautista were the representatives of six Filipino crewmembers of the cruise ship NORWAY who were killed when one of the
ship's boilers exploded. Plaintiffs' representatives filed suit in Florida's

85. Id.
86. Id. (citing In re Munzenreider Corp., 58 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986)).
87. The separate and distinct nature of NOVA's reimbursement obligation was also the
court of appeals basis for denying NOVA's claim for unjust enrichment. See id. at 1006.
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Fletcher v. Anderson, 616 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(per curiam)).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
94. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
95. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1293.
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state court system against defendant employers, the owners of the
NORWAY, for negligence and unseaworthiness under the Jones Act96
and for failure to provide maintenance, cure, and unearned wages under
the general maritime law of the United States. The crewmembers had
signed the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's
("POEA") 97 standard employment contract, which incorporated a
provision requiring that all disputes arising from the seaman's
employment be arbitrated in the Philippines.9" Defendants accordingly
removed the case to federal district court where they invoked the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (the "Convention")99 and successfully moved the court
to compel arbitration in the Philippines pursuant to the mandatory
arbitration clause of the POEA contract. Plaintiffs appealed the district
court's enforcement of the arbitration provision on two grounds:
jurisdiction and the affirmative defenses of the Convention. 00
Plaintiffs first challenged the district court's jurisdiction to enforce the
arbitration clause, arguing that the FAA exempted "seaman employment
contracts" from mandatory arbitration provisions. In suits involving a
motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Convention Act, the court
conducts a "very limited inquiry" 1 1 into the jurisdictional prerequisites. 10 2 The Bautista plaintiffs challenged two of the jurisdictional
prerequisites, contending that the arbitration provision was not an
"agreement in writing," and that it did not arise out of a "commercial
legal relationship." 3 The court of appeals rejected plaintiffs' "agreement in writing" challenge by pointing to the deceased crewmembers'

96. 46 App. U.S.C. § 688 (2000).
97. The POEA is a division of the Department of Labor and Employment of the
Republic of the Philippines. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1293.
98. Id.
99. 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (opened for signature June 10, 1958). The
Convention was implemented by Congress via chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the
"Convention Act"). 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-08 (2000).
100. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294-95.
101. Id. at 1294 (quoting Francisco v. Stolt Achievement Mt, 293 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir.
2002)).
102. The four jurisdictional prerequisites for enforcement of an arbitration provision
under the Convention are (1) an agreement in writing within the meaning of the
Convention; (2) the agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the
Convention; (3) the agreement arises out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
that is considered commercial; and (4) a party to the agreement is not an American citizen.
Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1295 n.7 (citing Std. Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d
440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003)).
103. Id. at 1295.
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The court of appeals then rejected
signed POEA agreements." 4
plaintiffs' argument that "the Convention [and] the Convention Act
impose upon the party seeking arbitration the burden of demonstrating
notice . . ." of the arbitration provision." 5
The court of appeals gave more attention to plaintiffs' commercial legal
10 6
relationship argument but ultimately ruled in favor of arbitration.
Plaintiffs focused on the word "commercial" by noting that the FAA
expressly exempts "seaman employment contracts" from its definition of
the "commercial" relationships to which the FAA applies.0 7 Although
it recognized the inapplicability of the FAA to seamen's employment
contracts, the court of appeals determined that a conflict existed between
the FAA's "narrow and specific" exemptions, and the Convention Act's
Unfortunately for plaintiffs,
"broad and generic" application.'08
"Congress gave the treaty-implementing statutes [like the Convention
Act] primacy in their fields, with FAA provisions applying only where
they did not conflict."'0 9 Due to the conflict on this point between the
FAA and the Convention Act, the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply the
FAA's "seamen's employment contract" exemption to arbitration
agreements covered by the Convention Act. "0
After rejecting the jurisdictional arguments, the court in Bautista
turned its attention to plaintiffs' affirmative defenses."' The first
defense, unconscionability, was based on the allegedly unequal bargaining power of the crewmembers when faced with the "take it or leave it"
employment contract.112 The court of appeals disagreed, noting that
the Philippine government protected the interests of its citizens through
the involvement of the POEA in the hiring process." 3 Furthermore,
the court of appeals rejected the unconscionability argument because
plaintiffs failed to provide authority for the existence of this affirmative
defense under the Convention."'

104. Id. at 1300-01.
105. Id. at 1301.
106. Id. at 1300.
107. Id. at 1296. The FAA's definition of "commerce" specifically states "nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen .. " 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
108. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1299.
109. Id. at 1297 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 208).
110. In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Fifth Circuit had refused on two
occasions to apply the FAA's "seaman employment contract" exemption to arbitration
agreements covered by the Convention Act. Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc.,
379 F.3d 327, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2004); Francisco, 293 F.3d at 273.
111. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1301-03.
112. Id. at 1302.
113. Id. at 1302 n.13.
114. Id. at 1302.
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Plaintiffs next argued that, under the law of the Philippines, the
arbitration provision was incapable of being performed because the
dispute at issue did not arise out of the employer-employee relationship.
In support of this theory, plaintiffs relied on Tolosa v. N.L.R.C., ' in
which the Philippines Supreme Court held that a deceased seaman's
claim was not a "claim arising from his employment," and thus, was not
arbitrable." 6 Tolosa was distinguishable, however, because it involved
a deceased crewmember's claim of gross negligence on the part of his
fellow shipmates, not his employers. Plaintiffs' claims in the case at bar,
on the other hand, were based on defendant employers' alleged breach
of their duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, and thus, implicated the
employer-employee relationship. The court of appeals, therefore,
determined that plaintiffs' claims were arbitrable and affirmed the
district court's grant of the motion to compel arbitration in the Philippines." 7
C.

Salvage
In InternationalAircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Aircraft,ll ' the Eleventh Circuit took a second look11 9 at
the question of what salvage rights, if any, plaintiff had to the wreckage
of a World War II-era Navy aircraft. 2 ' After locating the resting place
of a Navy "Devastator" TBD-1 torpedo bomber, plaintiff salvage company
filed suit in federal court to enjoin any interference with its salvage
efforts and potential salvage awards. The district court initially held
that plaintiff could salvage the aircraft, and it retained jurisdiction to
determine the amount, if any, of the salvage award.' 2' On its first
consideration of the case on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the United States could prohibit such private efforts at
salvaging the aircraft.'22 It remanded the case to determine when
plaintiff's salvage efforts had been effectively rejected by the govern-

115. G.R. No. 149578 (Phil. 2003), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/juris
prudence/2003/apr2003/149578/htm.
116. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302-03.
117. Id. at 1303.
118. 373 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
119. This salvage case was previously before the Eleventh Circuit in 2000 when the
Court held that the United States government, as the original owner of the plane, could
prohibit plaintiffs salvage efforts. Int'l Aircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. Unidentified Wrecked
& Abandoned Aircraft, 218 F.3d 1255, 1256 (11th Cir. 2000).
120. Int'l Aircraft Recovery, 373 F.3d at 1149-50.
121. Id. at 1149.
122. Id.
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ment." 3 On remand, the district court held that the government had
effectively rejected the salvage efforts when the director of the National
Museum of Naval Aviation ("NMNA") sent plaintiff a letter asserting the
Navy's continued ownership of the wreckage. Therefore, the district
plaintiff was not entitled to any salvage rights and
court held that
124
potential fees.

In its second appellate decision in this litigation, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the NMNA letter had effectively
rejected the salvage efforts of the plaintiff. 125 The court of appeals
focused its attention on the unequivocal language of the letter, which
stated that "[a]ny attempt at salvaging [the aircraft] without the express
written permission of the Department of the Navy . . .will result in a

recommendation from this office to institute whatever action is
appropriate to prevent an unauthorized taking."2 6
The court of appeals concluded that the NMNA letter had provided the
salvors with ample notice that the government did not authorize any
savage action undertaken by plaintiff. This conclusion was bolstered by
the fact that the president of plaintiff salvage company had testified in
his deposition that he had realized from the beginning that no agreement with the Navy had been reached and that the whole salvage
operation was a "gamble." 127

Based on the determination that the

government had rejected any salvage efforts of the company, and that
the company understood that no agreement for salvaging had been
reached, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
was not entitled to any rights or fees for unauthorized salvage
plaintiff
1 28
efforts.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The admiralty opinions penned by the United States Supreme Court
and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals were few in number in 2004,
which is indicative of the decreasing number of maritime cases that are
being filed in the federal court system. Despite the relatively small
number of opinions, the courts succeeded in providing guidance on
important issues in the traditional areas of cargo, longshore personal
injury, and salvage, as well as the emerging areas of passenger cruise
line law and alternative dispute resolution.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Int'l Aircraft Recovery, 218 F.3d at 1264.
Int'l Aircraft Recovery, 373 F.3d at 1150.
Id. at 1151.
Id.at 1150.
Id. at 1149 n.2.
Id. at 1150-51.

